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0. INTRODUCTION1 
Conservative views about composition posit that certain pluralities of objects compose—e.g., atoms 
compose molecules—and are either negative, or are neutral (by either suspending judgment or just 
remaining silent) about occurrence of composition for certain other pluralities of objects—e.g., a 
horse and a man. Conservative theories can differ in detail but they typically accept ontological posits 
of human perception, common sense, and their relatives, and deny—or2 just remain neutral 
about—the occurrence of composition for certain pluralities of objects beyond the grasp of such 
sources of forming ontological beliefs. In this thesis, I will argue that conservatism—as long as it 
relies on the perceptual capacities for its ontological posits—is either insufficient or untenable as a 
theory of material composition. I will further appeal to abductive methodology to argue that if 
ordinary objects exist, then universalism about composition is true: any plurality of objects composes 
an object. 
A main theme in this thesis is abductive methodology. The thesis is composed of two parts, 
each of which is an attempt to defend universalism on abductive grounds, with the second one 
serving as a respond to the nihilist who refuses to accept a major assumption in the first one. The 
first part argues for universalism on perceptual grounds. The main assumption of the argument 
given in part one (henceforth: the crucial assumption) is that ordinary objects—objects such as trees, 
cats and tables—do exist. I will appeal to certain metaphysical treatments of perception to argue 
for the existence of a myriad of extraordinary objects, similar to the way some conservatives would 
want to argue from perception to existence of ordinary objects, which in turn suggests that such 
conservative views are either false or insufficient (depending on whether they deny or just remain 
silent about existence of extraordinary objects). I then appeal to abductive reasoning to argue that 
universalism is the best theory of composition that respects3 the crucial assumption and ‘explains’ the 
                                                 
1I dedicate this thesis to my parents. Also, special thanks to Juhani Yli-Vakkuri, Bryan Frances and Alex Davies for 
teaching me philosophy over my MA studies at the University of Tartu. 
2There seems to be no consensus among the conservatives about the ontological status of non-perceivable or non-
commonsensical objects. As Fairchild and Hawthorne closely put it for the case of common sense: “[...] it is far from 
clear whether common sense takes a stand on extraordinary objects. Even granting that common sense does not 
commit itself to a certain class of extraordinary objects, it remains to be seen whether it is antithetical or merely 
neutral in regards to the question of their existence. Granted, they do “escape our notice” [quoting (Korman 2015)], 
at least ordinarily. But why, then, suppose that by the lights of common sense, they seem not to exist?”(Fairchild and 
Hawthorne 2018:2) 
3This is a critical restriction here. As we’ll see in part two of the thesis, there are other theories of composition, such 
as nihilism, that apparently can explain—by appealing to certain paraphrase methods—the apparent existence of 
ordinary and extraordinary objects that Byrne and I argue for, but they do not respect the crucial assumption, hence I 
won’t consider them in part one when it comes to abductive comparisons. 
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abundance of composite objects that is argued for from perceptual experiences, where by ‘explains’ 
I mean that it entails or predicts their existence, or somehow elucidates their apparent existence. 
Part two of the thesis takes into consideration the fact that the compositional nihilist 
antecedently refuses the crucial assumption by positing that there are no composite objects 
whatsoever, so ordinary objects don’t exist. I will lay out a detailed analysis of different species of 
nihilism, universalism and their ideological and ontological commitments to abductively argue that, 
even though nihilism blocks my argument for universalism put forward in part one, there are 
independent abductive reasons to choose universalism over nihilism and some other theories of 
composition. 
Finally, three remarks about the scope of the thesis is in order. First, the conservative views 
that I am concerned with throughout the first part of the thesis are majorly those which extensively 
rely on human perception, common sense, and/or cognition to posit the existence of the so-called 
ordinary objects. But admittedly there are other accounts of composition which lie in between 
nihilism and universalism, but which are not of the kind of conservatism that I am concerned with 
in the first part of the thesis (however we will meet some of them in the second part). For example, 
organicism posits the existence of living organisms—such as Donald Trump—but denies the 
existence of any other composite objects—such as border walls. In the second part of the thesis, 
however, I will take into account a wider range of conservative views along with nihilism and 
universalism, for abductive comparisons, including organicism. 
Second, the crucial assumption in the first part of the thesis (that ordinary objects exist) is 
motivated within the lines of an argument that Alex Byrne has recently put forward at (Byrne 
forthcoming), where he proposes a metaphysical treatment of perception. That said, this does not 
mean that there can’t be other ways of arguing for the existence of ordinary objects from 
perception. Indeed, there have been other people4 taking different routes to propose such 
arguments. I will remain open to whether such different arguments from perception for the 
existence of ordinary objects can also be generalized to argue for the existence of extraordinary 
objects, and will only pursue my argument parallel to Byrne’s approach. 
And finally, my appeal to abductive grounds will only take into account ideological and 
ontological commitments of the rival theories of composition, and argues that universalism is the 
best among them. Abductive methodology, however, often also takes into account certain other 
                                                 
4 For example, (Korman 2015) puts forward an argument for the existence of ordinary objects form “perceptual 
awareness” along with “apprehension” of certain facts about objects to argue for the existence of ordinary objects. 
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virtues such as explanatory power of theories—that is, how they do with regards to solving certain 
puzzles and/or explaining other phenomena and concepts in other areas of philosophy or sciences. 
This thesis—due to word and focus limits—will remain silent about such aspects of the theories of 
composition, leaving this issue open to further investigation. That means that the result of this 
paper, namely that universalism is the best theory of composition, might be subject to revision if 
other factors such as explanatory power of theories are taken into consideration. 
 
PART ONE: PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE, ABDUCTIVE 
METHODOLOGY, AND UNIVERSALISM 
 
1. FROM PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE OF ORDINARY OBJECTS 
TO EXISTENCE FO EXTRAORDINARY OBJECTS 
In this section I will argue that if our perceptual experience of ordinary objects is an indicator of 
their existence, then the possibility of perceptual experience of the so-called extraordinary objects 
as single objects is also an indicator of their existence. By an ‘ordinary object’, I mean an object 
whose existence is approved by our perceptual capacities, and by ‘approved by’, I mean that the 
normal exercise of our perceptual capacities leads us (or, at least, the non-philosophers among us) 
to believe that they exist. For example, an orange, Donald Trump, a chair, or any other object that 
we normally perceive via any of our five senses and consider them as objects are count as ordinary 
objects. By ‘extraordinary object’, we mean objects that even if they exist, their existence is not 
approved by our perceptual system. For example, if a horse and a man compose a further object, 
namely a horseman, then, since a horseman isn’t something that we normally perceive as an object, 
it counts as an extraordinary object. Below I will first motivate and then assume the crucial 
assumption: that our perceptual experience of what seem to be ordinary objects is an indicator of 
their existence in the actual world. 
One way to motivate the crucial assumption is to argue that we have to rely on our 
perceptual and cognitive apparatus (no matter how limited) in order to acquire knowledge of the 
material world. As Daniel Korman puts it: 
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We cannot, as it were, get outside of our skins and check the way our experiences represent 
the world as being against the way the world in fact is. (Korman 2015:115) 
 
Korman gives a detailed argument that the demand for proof of the reliability of all sources of 
information leads to unjustifiability of believing in any proposition, hence global skepticism. But 
the reliance on perceptual and cognitive apparatus in general, although inevitable, does not seem to 
necessarily imply that our ontological beliefs always ought to be veridical. For example, it seems 
that one could have some coarse-grained beliefs about the world that are knowledge (e.g., that either 
there are dogs or there are things arranged dog-wise or the universe is dog-y, etc.), while not have 
a fine-grained such knowledge which Korman advocates (e.g., that there are dogs), and hence, still 
not face global skepticism. 
Another way to motivate the crucial assumption is by appealing to accounts of perception. 
Contemporary philosophy of perception tends to widely5 entertain some sort of 
“presentationalism” (Byrne forthcoming) about perception according to which perceptual evidence 
consist of facts about particular objects, e.g., that this table is red, or that tomato is wholesome. 
Those facts contain information about the perceived objects, such as the particular objects 
themselves—what objects are perceived—their properties, features, how they are arranged in the 
environment, and that all those properties, aspects and arrangements concern those particular 
objects that are perceived. As McDowell puts it, those facts are a “tract of the environment” 
(McDowell 1994:191). 
Now, some philosophers of perception have put forward arguments from perception for 
the existence of ordinary objects. One such recent attempt is proposed by Alex Byrne in (Byrne 
forthcoming), where he posits a metaphysical treatment of the perceptual experience of ordinary 
objects to argue for their existence. 
 
The main assumption in Byrne’s argument—“SCENE”—is as follows:  
 
Visual states (successful or illusory) are characterized by a certain sort of proposition, a scene, that 
such and such things are arranged thus and so, which is present to consciousness and determines 
the way things seem. (Byrne forthcoming:9) 
                                                 
5 Very similar thoughts can be found in (Campbell 2002; Fish 2009; McDowell 1994; Schellenberg 2016; Tye 2011). 
Also see (Byrne forthcoming:5–6) for further references on this. 
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Byrne grants SCENE to argue that the scenes in the case of perception of ordinary objects are 
‘singular’, or object-dependent propositions6, which in turn imply the existence of ordinary objects 
upon their perception.7 
Here I will argue that if Byrne’s metaphysical treatment of perception is correct, then his 
argument can be generalized to argue for the existence of a large number of extraordinary objects 
such as horsemen as well. Following Byrne8, here I will simply assume the following: 
(A) If an agent A has a perceptual experience of what is perceived as an object o, then the content of A’s 
perceptual state is a singular proposition P(o) which is present to A’s consciousness. 
I will now argue that horses and humans do compose, that is, compositions of horses and men, 
call them horsemen, exist. The argument runs as follows: 
 
Consider the fox-hunting contests that are, or were, common in many countries in the world: 
human hunters ride horses to track, chase, and kill foxes in certain areas. Let us consider a narrower 
example of a fox hunting scenario for my purposes. Suppose there is a restricted area somewhere 
in the UK where hundreds of foxes live. Also, suppose those foxes never see any humans or horses, 
unless when a human is riding a horse to hunt them.9 
Now, what are the hunters to the foxes in that region? It seems plausible to think that they 
do not really distinguish between the humans and the horses that they ride, in the sense of counting 
them as separate objects, but rather perceive them as single objects with certain appearances and 
behavioral characteristics. If the community of foxes had a language and enough linguistic 
                                                 
6 A singular, or object-dependent proposition is one that is directly about an object, and that as long as it takes a truth 
value, it entails the existence of the objects that it is about. For example, the sentence ‘Donald Trump is the president 
of the US.’, whether true or false, entails the existence of Donald Trump. The sentence wouldn’t have taken any truth 
value, if Trump didn’t exist. 
7 One might ask whether according to Byrne’s argument, the perceptual experience of a so-called ordinary object 
defeasibly indicates its existence, or it guarantees its existence. Byrne doesn’t specify which one he commits to, so 
throughout the rest of the thesis I will also remain neutral regarding this. 
8 Note again that there have been other arguments for existence of ordinary objects from perception, but as I have 
mentioned before, here I will only pursue my argument for the existence of extraordinary objects within the lines of 
Byrne’s approach, and leave it open whether different arguments from perception for the existence of ordinary 
objects can similarly be generalizable to argue for the existence of extraordinary objects. 
9 (Byrne forthcoming) isn’t explicit about whether the metaphysical underlying explanation of human perception 
depends on brain’s hardwiring, or not. I will assume that it does, so I will assume that the foxes in my thought 
experiment have been—due to evolutionary reasons—developed some sort of brain and cognitive hardwiring so that 
they wouldn’t be able see a human or a horse on their own, just as we humans have been hardwired so that we cannot 
detect and distinguish, say, the microscopic structure of objects with bare eyes. If it turns out that hardwiring doesn’t 
matter in Byrne’s argument, one can simply drop the related assumption about foxes as well. 
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capabilities, they would probably have called each of those things with general terms such as, say, 
‘horseman’, rather than with conjunction of two general terms for two distinguished objects, such 
as ‘horse and man’.  
Now, if Byrne is right about the metaphysics of perceptual experiences, then a fox’s 
perceptual experience of a horse and a man appearing to it as a single object has a content, and that 
content is an object-dependent proposition whose existence depends on the existence of what is 
perceived as an object—here, the horseman—and such an object-dependent proposition is present 
to the fox’s consciousness when it is perceptually experiencing the horse and the man as an object. 
So, since in the possible world where the scenario is happening such propositions exist as the 
content of perceptual experiences of the foxes, then the pair of a horse and a man should compose 
a single object, the horseman. So the horsemen exist in the possible world in question.  
Now, since the single object in that world is composed of two other objects (whose 
existence as separate objects, however, is unbeknownst to the foxes), we can say that the single 
object in that possible world is the composition of a human and a horse, under a certain 
arrangement of them. That is, under certain arrangements, horses and men do compose in some 
possible world—or, possibly compose.  
What this suggests is that a plurality of objects (here, a human and a horse) that—in the 
lights of certain conservative views on composition—do not actually compose at all, do compose 
a single object under certain arrangements of its parts—in the lights of the foxes’ perceptual 
experiences in another possible world. This, of course, does not immediately imply that horses and 
men actually compose, but anyone who accepts, on the grounds just given, the view that under 
certain arrangements horses and humans possibly compose faces a serious challenge here if they 
don’t further accept that horses and humans actually compose under the same arrangement. They 
will have to come up with some explanation of why humans and horses compose in worlds where 
foxes with a certain kind of cognitive hardwiring exist while they don’t compose in the actual world, 
where (let us suppose) no such foxes exist. It is hard to see how anything short of a form of idealism 
according to which things there are depends in part on which things are actually perceived, and I, 
just as any realist about the world, tend to avoid such idealistic commitments.10 
                                                 
10 It’s worth noting that while conservatism might seem to be committed to a kind of idealism about what there is, 
it’s merely consistent with it; conservatives will presumably agree that not only do certain arrangements of rocks and 
soil make up mountains, but that it is necessary that such arrangements of rocks and soils make up mountains, and 
that they do so whether or not there are anyone around to perceive any mountains. 
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Notice that similar arguments can be given for composition of humans and horses with 
many different sorts of arrangements than the ones in the fox-hunting scenario. For example, if the 
humans sit on the horses backwards, the arrangement is different than when they sit on the horses 
in a normal way, but similar thought experiments can be proposed to argue that the horses and the 
humans under the new arrangement still actually compose. In general, it is not difficult to propose 
certain other thought experiments in order to show that contrary to what a conservative view may 
posit, many other objects do actually compose: e.g., humans and horses; spiders, cups of coffees 
and pencils; oranges, Donald Trump, and border walls; pistols, flowers, cigarettes, and all trees in a 
forest; the Eifel tower and all of the visitors around it. 
Now I am not going to give a comprehensive list of pluralities of objects that are possibly 
perceivable as single objects, as I don’t know where the boundaries of possible cognition and 
perception are. But wherever those boundaries might be, admittedly, there also seems to be many 
pluralities that cannot possibly be perceptually conceived as single objects. For example, the 
plurality of all atoms in the universe, or all the galaxies with an even number of planets in them, 
etc. Again, I am not going to give a comprehensive list of pluralities that are impossible to be 
perceived as single objects, for the same reason that I didn’t propose a comprehensive list of the 
possibly perceivable ones. In short, it is easy to see that even though my arguments so far suggest 
that there are a lot more composite objects than what humans’ perceptual faculties can actually 
grasp, we still do not get universalism. The next section is dedicated to that purpose, but before that, 
I will respond to two potential objections that may raise immediately against the thought 
experiment above, and then to give a summary of the argument for the existence of the horsemen. 
This first objection is this: “Foxes don’t have conscious mental state (if they have mental state 
at all) in order to have a such-and-such proposition present to their “consciousness” when they 
visually experience the so-called horseman.” First of all, it’s not quite obvious that no non-human 
animal has conscious mental state when they perceptually experience their environment. Indeed, 
there are physiological, neurological and evolutionary accounts of consciousness that support the 
existence and, further, commonality of conscious experience among non-human animals. As Allen 
and Trestman put it: 
The [arguments in favor of animal consciousness] may also be bolstered by scientific investigations 
of behavior and the comparative study of brain anatomy and physiology, as well as considerations 
of evolutionary continuity between species. Neurological similarities between humans and other 
animals have been taken to suggest commonality of conscious experience; all mammals share the 
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same basic brain anatomy, and much is shared with vertebrates more generally. Even structurally 
different brains may be neurodynamically similar in ways that enable inferences about animal 
consciousness to be drawn. (Allen and Trestman 2017) 
 
But we don’t even have to dive into the debates over animal consciousness or cognition here; there 
is a simpler response to this kind of objection: the fox-hunting scenario can simply be reconstructed 
to take a human narrative (instead of foxes), and humans do have consciousness, and their mental 
states do have contents, after all, and since humans are the main target of Byrne’s account of 
perception, we can just run his arguments directly for similar thought experiments designed for 
human agents. For instance, suppose, instead of foxes, there is a tribe of humans in Amazon rain 
forests who have never seen a lion and a cat separately, and only once in a while see them sticking 
together and riding fiercely toward the tribe to throw candies at them and run away! The same 
arguments as before can be made, and hence, under certain arrangements, a lion and a cat compose 
an object (hence lion-cats exist).11 
Another objection: “It sounds like cheating to take the visual experience of the so-called 
horseman as an indicative of its existence as a single object similar to the visual experience of a 
chair as indicative of its existence as a single object. You are already assuming the horse and the man 
to compose a single object, which in turn makes the corresponding object-dependent proposition 
(which is the content of the related visual experience) exist. What if there is an object-dependent 
proposition present to the fox’s consciousness, but that proposition depends on, say, two objects, 
namely the horse and the man?”  
This objection is not legitimate12, but even if it was, then I would turn the table to the 
objector and ask a similar question: what if the content of our visual experience of a so-called chair 
is a proposition whose existence does not depend on a chair, but rather on its legs and its surface, 
as its alleged parts? And the content of my visual experience of each of those parts depends on the 
smaller parts that compose those parts, etc.? And I can keep on going down to the level of atoms 
                                                 
11 Peter van Inwagen gives a fable about “bligers” that’s very similar in spirit to my horseman and lion-cat scenarios: 
“A bliger […] is really six animals. Its 'legs' are four monkey-like creatures, its 'trunk' a sort of sloth, and its 'head' a 
species of owl. Any six animals of the proper species can combine temporarily to form a bliger […]. The illusion is 
amazing. Even a trained zoologist observing a bliger from a distance of ten meters would swear that he was seeing a 
single, unified animal.”(Van Inwagen 1995:104). However, Inwagen, unlike me, doesn’t think that that amounts for 
bligers to exist. 
12 This doesn’t seem to be a legitimate objection, however. Singular propositions, as typically understood, are 
propositions that are directly about, or with respect to, only one object. The proposition that Hesperus is not 
Neptune is singular w.r.t both Venus (Hesperus) and Neptune, for example. 
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(which—let us suppose—are the mereological simples13 of the material world): what if the content 
of my visual experience of the so-called chair is just some kind of proposition whose existence 
depends on the existence of those parts only, and not a chair which is composed of them? As one 
can see, this route will end up not only in undermining the objector’s assumption of the existence 
of the chair, but also perhaps in compositional nihilism. I take my response to serve only as a reply 
to the chair-believer who is a horseman-denier, but I take the objection from nihilism more 
seriously. The second part of the thesis is dedicated to undermining nihilism (in favor of 
universalism) based on independent philosophical grounds. 
 
To conclude this section, here is the perceptual argument for the existence of horsemen in a 
nutshell: 
Assume (A): if an agent A has a perceptual experience of what is perceived as an object o, then the content of A’s 
perceptual state is a singular proposition P(o) which is present to A’s consciousness. Now, according to the fox-
hunting-like scenarios, (B): the agent A could have perceived a horse and a man under a certain arrangement 
as an object. Now, by (A) and (B), we have (C): there is a possible world at which A has a perceptual experience 
of a so-called horseman, and the content of that perceptual experience is a proposition that exists only if the so-called 
horseman exists as an object in that possible world. Therefore, (D): there is a possible world at which the horseman 
exists as an object, under a certain arrangement of the horse and the man. Now, as I mentioned before, it 
would be difficult to hold a non-idealistic outlook about the world and yet deny that under a certain 
arrangement of its members, if a plurality of objects possibly composes an object, it would actually 
do so. So I take it for granted that (E): any plurality of objects that possibly composes under some arrangement 
of its members, actually composes under the same arrangement of the members in the actual world.14 So, by (D) 
and (E), we can say that (F): the horseman that could possibly be perceived by agent A, actually exists under 
the relevant arrangement of the horse and the man. Now, since—even though unbeknownst to the agent—
the alleged object, i.e., the horseman, contains the horse and the man as parts (which are distributed 
in the space under a certain arrangement), that implies that (G): the horse and the man actually compose. 
 
                                                 
13 A mereological simple is an object that doesn’t have proper parts. 
14 Formally put, this says:  ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑎 (◇∃𝑥 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥, 𝑎) → (𝐴𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥, 𝑎) → ∃𝑥 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥, 𝑎))), rather than 
the stronger claim  ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑎 (◇∃𝑥 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥, 𝑎) → ∃𝑥 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥, 𝑎)), where a is an arrangement of the 
members of the plurality xx, 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥, 𝑎) is read as ‘the plurality xx, under the arrangement a, composes x, and 
𝐴𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥, 𝑎) means that the members of the plurality xx are arranged a-wise. 
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2. FROM THE EXISTENCE OF EXTRAORDINARY OBJECTS TO 
UNIVERSALISM 
Now, we have a set of data stating that all those pluralities of objects that are possibly perceivable 
as objects actually compose, and we want to find a theory that best explains the data. So far I have 
been arguing that the negative existential claims that certain perceptually motivated conservative 
theories embrace are false. So perceptually motivated conservative theories, in general, cannot be 
good fits to our data, because they either embrace such negative posits (hence inconsistent with the 
extraordinary objects that have just been argued for) or remains silent about their truth (hence 
consistent with, yet insufficient for explaining the posited extraordinary objects). Another option 
is to restrict our ontological posits to the boundaries of possible cognition: for any plurality of 
objects xx, the members of xx compose if and only if it is possible for some cognitive system to 
perceive them as a composite object. This kind of theory sounds like the minimal account 
composition that homogeneously explains the existence of the myriad number of extraordinary 
objects that the fox-hunting-like thought experiments suggest. Granted, however, this will commit 
us again to some sort of idealism about the external world, according to which, what exists is what 
is possibly perceivable. Now, although this kind of idealism is stronger than the one that we 
previously encountered (according to which, what exists is what is actually perceivable)—I, again, as 
much as any other realist, wish to avoid it. 
Now, given that conservatism is undermined, idealism is unwanted, and universalism is the 
simplest15 and strongest theory available that respects the crucial assumption that ordinary objects 
exist, then abductive reasoning automatically selects universalism as the theory that best explains 
the existence of all of those countless-many composite objects that can possibly be perceived.  
Finally, and before I finish part one of the thesis, one comparative note is in order. My 
route to universalism does not suffer from the epistemic instability that certain other universalist 
strategies suffer from. For example, (Hawthorne 2006a; Sider 2001) had formerly advocated 
permissivist views about composition by endorsing the assumption that humans’ perceptually and 
cognitively motivated affirmative ontological beliefs are veridical, and then, concluding that there 
must be all sorts of composite objects in order for those beliefs not to be accompanied by some 
magical luck associated with humans’ grasp of the fabric of reality. One can give this a safety-
                                                 
15 There are other permissivist theories that might—under certain readings—be proper candidates as well. For 
example, the doctrine of plenitude can equally do the job, but it is more complex than universalism. 
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theoretic tone and advocate universalism by pointing out that if there aren’t all those composite 
objects that universalism posits, then our ontological beliefs about composition would be too unsafe 
to amount to knowledge. That is, there must always be enough targets to hit in order for our 
ontological beliefs to be safe enough to amount to knowledge, and hence, for the crucial 
assumption to hold. 
But as the recent reflections on this strategy suggest, populating the world in order to justify 
the presumed accuracy of our ontological beliefs is very ad hoc, and generally unacceptable. To give 
an example along the lines of those suggested by (Fairchild and Hawthorne 2018; Korman 2015), 
suppose you point to a bird in the sky and ask your friend which continents have that species of 
bird, and she replies ‘Europe and North America’. However, she later admits that she named two 
continents at random, but the belief you formed on the basis of trusting her was true, because 
unbeknownst to her, (let us assume) the bird species in question is found on every continent. The 
fact that the bird species is found on every continent makes her answer and your belief ‘safe’ in 
some sense, but not in the right sense to secure knowledge. Some of the relevantly similar cases 
include cases—which are counterfactually distant yet ‘close’ in the epistemic sense—in which the 
distribution of birds across continents is very different and her answer is false. Just as populating 
all the continents with birds is not sufficient for knowledge in this case, populating the world with 
all sorts of composite objects does not seem to be sufficient for knowledge in the case of our 
ontological beliefs, because it seems that even though your belief is true, you easily could have 
formed a false belief in that situation, due to the randomness of the response, and the relevant 
proneness to error is an indicative of lack of knowledge. 
My argument, on the other hand, although similarly assumes that our perceptual 
experiences of ordinary objects (and so the affirmative ontological beliefs about them) are veridical, 
it also appeals to certain metaphysical accounts of perception to argue that the same holds for non-
human animals’ perceptual experiences, or alternatively, any other possible human perceptual 
experience of the so-called extraordinary objects. This, I argued, gets us very close to universalism. 
Then, I appeal to abductive reasoning to argue that universalism is the simplest and strongest theory 
of composition that respects the crucial assumption and best explains the existence of the myriad 
of objects that are possible objects of perception. In short, my argument does not—due to fear of 
miracles or an unsafe environment for knowledge formation—justify universalism in an ad hoc 
way. 
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PART TWO: A NIHILIST OBJECTION, AN ABDUCTIVE 
RESPONSE 
3. BACKGROUND 
As the reader remembers from part one, the crucial assumption stated that the perceptual 
experience of ordinary objects is an indicator of their existence, and I appealed to certain 
metaphysical accounts of perception, plus abductive methodology, to argue that this leads us 
towards universalism. But the nihilist antecedently refuses to accept the crucial assumption. In the 
lights of nihilism there are no composite objects, whatsoever, so there can’t be any ordinary objects 
and/or veridical perceptual experience of them. In this part of the thesis I will argue that even 
though the nihilist can block my argument for universalism, an independent, detailed analysis of 
nihilism shows that it is still abductively inferior to universalism, hence universalism is still to be 
preferred to nihilism, as a theory of material composition.  
In the kind of abductive comparison that I will be making, I will only consider theoretical 
simplicity, which is usually measured by comparing ideological and ontological commitments of 
the theories in question. It’s widely held that simplicity or parsimony is a criterion of theory choice, 
especially in metaphysics (see section 8 for more on this). A theory’s ideology consists of the 
irreducible/undefined logical or extralogical notions that it appeals to in order to express its 
propositions, whereas its ontology consists of the objects that need to exist in order for those 
propositions to be true. Admittedly, however, a more comprehensive abductive comparison 
between theories usually also take into consideration other deciding factors such as explanatory 
power—whether the theory in question can explain certain puzzles or paradoxes in other areas in 
philosophy and/or sciences. But in the last section, my abductive comparison will only take into 
account the theoretical simplicity, disregarding of other deciding factors such as explanatory power. 
The main reason is the focus and the length limits of the thesis, but also it’s very common16 to 
argue for and against certain theories of material composition such as nihilism based only on 
simplicity grounds. 
The typical nihilist strategy for rejecting the occurrence of composition is to withdraw the 
predicate for parthood (i.e., ‘… is part of’) from the fundamental language of ontology. Therefore, 
this nihilist approach endangers all theories that endorse occurrence of composition in some 
                                                 
16 Among others, (Bennett 2009a; Brenner 2015a; Sider 2013; Tallant 2014; Uzquiano 2004) have taken this approach 
to argue for or against compositional nihilism. 
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cases—be it conservatism, organicism, universalism, or any other theory of composition that posits 
material composite objects of some sort in its ontology.  
A primary attraction17 of nihilism is admittedly its ideological and ontological parsimony: by 
eliminating the talk of parthood, and consequently the composite objects from the world, the 
nihilist offers a simpler outlook of the material world, compared to those which believe in 
composition. Nihilism, however, immediately faces an incredulous stare: all of the talk of 
composites will have to be declared as either falsehood or truth-value-less, which not only targets 
the ordinary, common-sense talk of tables and chairs, but may also endangers the credibility of all 
of our non-subatomic sciences: all of their affirmative propositions that concern composite objects 
are either falsehoods or lack truth-values. By an ‘affirmative proposition’ I mean a proposition that 
states or entails occurrence of composition. For example, ‘molecules are composed of atoms’, or 
‘the table over there is black’ (assuming that the table is a composite object). 
Nihilists therefore have often listened to Quine’s influential advice on balancing our daily-
life talk of objects with our ontological doubts, and have championed certain methods of 
paraphrase for the talk of composites in terms of the talk of simples, perhaps to avoid such 
unpleasant consequences. For example, the nihilist would typically say that there are no tables, but, 
roughly put, there are some of table-wise arrangements of simples that do not compose anything 
whatsoever; they are just swarms of small particles under certain arrangements which exhibit certain 
collective properties, so that they appear to us as composites.  
But different people18 have argued that nihilism—as soon as equipped with a method of 
paraphrase—starts to lose its primary simplicity over further ideological or ontological complexity: 
the theory becomes more complex than certain other theories of composition that employ a 
predicate for parthood. In the rest of this paper, I will attempt a detailed argument along these lines. 
But before doing so, let us consider an objection to the whole project. 
One may object: “What if nihilists could somehow explain the falsehood of affirmative 
beliefs about composition without appealing to methods of paraphrase?” My response would be: 
they might be able to do so, but what’s important is that so far, it is the standard practice of nihilism 
                                                 
17 Other people have revealed other attractions about nihilism, such as its explanatory power in solving certain 
puzzles and paradoxes such as the Special Composition Question (Van Inwagen 1995), The Problem of Many (Unger 
1980), Theoretical Unification (Brenner 2015b), etc., but I will not be concerned with them throughout this thesis. 
18 For example, (Bennett 2009a; Elder 2011; Tallant 2014; Unger 2014; Uzquiano 2004). For a defense against such 
criticisms see (Brenner 2015a). 
  
17 
 
to do employ methods of paraphrase, and there’s simply no serious nihilist account out there which 
doesn’t. As Karen Bennet puts it:  
Importantly, this is the only kind of nihilist on the table. […] As it happens, all actual nihilists are of this 
kind. But if there were any nihilists who just sort of smiled and said that nothing remotely in the 
ballpark of talk about composites was true, they would not be in play in this paper. (Bennett 
2009b:60) 
 
Finally, and in the interest of a more precise analysis of the subject matter, from now on I will 
distinguish different versions of nihilism and universalism: ‘Strong Nihilism’ posits that no objects 
other than simples exists, whatsoever, whereas ‘Weak Nihilism’ states that there are objects other than 
simples, but they are not composites; rather, they are complexes—which are sets of simples—and which 
are not19 composites, but nevertheless are non-simple, collective entities. On the other hand, 
‘Strong Universalism’ posits that every plurality of objects composes an object20, whereas ‘Weak 
Universalism’ states that any plurality of objects amounts to an object which is not composite but a 
complex object, and by ‘amounts to’ I mean set-membership; that is, a plurality of objects amounts 
to a complex object if and only if the members of the plurality are elements of the set in question.21 
 
                                                 
19 At the first glance, it might seem that the difference between composite and complex objects is a verbal one, as the 
predicate for set membership may seem to play equal role as for the predicate for parthood. But this is incorrect. For 
starters, one can give examples in which the difference is obvious. For one, take this: I was a member of the logic 
group at Tehran Polytechnic, but I wasn’t part of the logic group there. Or: The American people are part of the 
English speaking people, but they are not a member of the (set of) English speaking people.  Another difference: we 
can often decompose a whole into parts in different ways, but we can’t decompose a set into its elements in more 
than one way. As Michele Potter puts it: “The fusion of the cards in a pack is made up out of just those cards [i.e., 
the cards are part of the pack], but they cannot be said to be its members, since it is also made up out of the four 
suits [i.e., the suits are parts of the pack, in a different decomposition of the very same pack.]” (Potter 2005:22) So, 
the set of cards is different than the set of suits, even though the pack is nothing over and above its cards, and also 
nothing over and above its suits – and yet those parts compose the same pack. Furthermore, set-membership is a 
necessary matter, whereas parthood is not. For example, it’s impossible for the number 1 not to be a member of the set 
of natural numbers (or alternatively, the set of natural numbers without 1 is just a different set). But parthood can be 
contingent. For example your broken lamp is part of your house, but your house remains a house even without that 
broken lamp. 
20 Note that Strong Universalism is exactly what I have formerly been calling “Universalism”. 
21 Note that the focus of this thesis is on material objects, and presumably the amount of matter/energy in the entire 
universe is (finite, but at any rate) not too big not to fit in a set. So one cannot simply consider the definition of weak 
universalism as futile by pointing to the fact not every plurality of things amounts to a set (e.g., the plurality of all sets 
doesn’t form a set, pace to Russell’s paradox), and ask “how do we know that for any plurality of material objects 
there can (in principle) be a set containing them as its members?” 
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4. ON METHODS OF PARAPHRASE FOR NIHILISM 
As I mentioned earlier, the traditional way that nihilists paraphrase the talk of ordinary objects is in 
terms of arrangement of simples. For example, the sentence ‘there is a table here’ is paraphrased 
away as ‘there are some simples here arranged table-wise’, or Van Inwagen’s classic example “some 
chairs are heavier than some tables” is suggested to be paraphrased as “There are xs that are 
arranged chairwise and there are ys that are arranged tablewise and the xs are heavier than the 
ys.”(Van Inwagen 1995:109), where the arrangement in question is a plural predicate. Now, a crucial 
question is: what is the logical structure of the paraphrased statements themselves? For example, 
what is the logical structure of Inwagen’s paraphrased sentence? Two dominant methods of 
paraphrase have been proposed in the literature. One is in terms of sets (Sider 2013; Uzquiano 2004), 
and the other one in terms of plural quantification (Brenner 2015a; Uzquiano 2004; Van Inwagen 
1995). 
On the first reading, the paraphrase will look like ‘there is a set of simples arranged chair-
wise so that the weight of its elements is more than the weight of some set of simples arranged 
table-wise’. On the second reading, the sentence would be read as ‘there is a plurality of simples 
arranged chair-wise weigh more than some plurality of simples arranged table-wise’, in which—due 
to the standard orthodoxy22 about plural logic—there is no commitment to abstract objects like 
sets, but only pluralities of objects that don’t constitute any collective entity in any metaphysical 
sense—even though they might do so in a linguistic sense. 
Now, a challenge to the nihilist methods of paraphrase appears. As (Uzquiano 2004) 
observes, singular quantification over composites can be paraphrased in terms of plural 
quantification over simples, but what about plural quantification over composites? Consider 
Uzquiano’s favorite sentence “some bricks are touching each-other”(Uzquiano 2004:435). There is 
a plural predicate—‘touching each other’—in this sentence that can only be instantiated collectively 
by composites. But the nihilist denies the existence of composites and paraphrases their talk in 
terms of pluralities or sets of simples under certain arrangements. To overcome this difficulty, 
Uzquiano offers two strategies to the nihilist: either to use plurally plural quantification over simples, 
or, to appeal to monadic second-order logic enriched with plural properties. 
Over the next few sections I will open this issue further. As the reader will see, some of 
what comes below has already been addressed in the literature, but I—in the interest of a more 
                                                 
22 This aspect of plural logic is often known as its “ontological innocence”. 
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honest and comprehensive analysis—will either revise or add up to them. For example, in section 
5 I introduce the set-theoretic method of paraphrase for the nihilist, which, as we will see, has 
already been suggested in the literature, but I will further argue that it needs to be revised in order 
to capture certain characteristics of composite objects (section 5.1) and that one who subscribes to 
weak nihilism will be naturally led to endorsing weak universalism (section 5.2). Similarly for section 
6: even though the idea of appealing to plurally plural logic (section 6.1) and plural properties 
(section 6.2) have already been suggested, I will contribute to the discussion by revealing some 
implicit ideological commitments of the latter, which has not been done prior to this thesis. Section 
7 is entirely original, and section 8, where the abductive comparison happens, is also original, both 
because of the diversity of the accounts of composition that it considers and also because now the 
new revisions play essential role in the final judgments about the simplicity of theories. 
 
5. SET-THEORETIC METHOD OF PARAPHRASE 
As we have already seen, the idea of a set-theoretic paraphrase method is to express the talk of 
composites in terms of sets of simples with certain arrangements. A table, for example, is identified 
with the set of its constituting simples. (Sider 2013) calls for a set-theoretic paraphrase method 
when addressing a possible nihilist-friendly foundation for fundamental theories of physics, as a 
project which is broader in extent than just the elimination of parthood predicate in the ordinary 
talk of material objects. On the other hand, (Uzquiano 2004) proposes the set-theoretic paraphrase 
as one way to interpret monadic second-order logic which is—due to (Boolos 1984)—in turn inter-
definable with plural quantification, and which promises a way of paraphrasing the talk of  
composites somehow in terms of simples: in terms of sets of them, or sets of sets of them. As 
(Sider 2013:8) mentions, a set-theoretic method of paraphrase leads to “softening” nihilism: 
composite objects do not exist, but collective objects of some sort—complexes, which are sets of 
simples—do exist, after all. Notice that Sider’s “soft” nihilism coincides the “weak nihilism” in my 
terminology.   
Before moving on to the method of paraphrase based on plural quantification, one proviso 
about the set-theoretic method of paraphrase is in order. (Uzquiano, 2004) argues that in some 
cases, the nihilist would have to adopt plural quantification besides the machinery of set theory. For 
instance, the sentence ‘some bricks are touching each other’ is best paraphrased with plural 
quantification over composites and the plural predicate ‘…are touching each other’ as follows: 
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Some composites, the xxs, are such that (i) for every y, if y is one of the xxs, then y is a brick, and 
(ii) the xxs are touching each other. (Uzquiano 2004:435) 
 
Where the first existential quantifier ranges over composites, which are themselves pluralities of 
simples with certain arrangements. Now, to translate this in terms of sets, Uzquiano proposes the 
following paraphrase:  
  
Some sets of simples, the sss, are such that (i) for every set s, if s is one of the sss, then the members 
of s are arranged brickwise, and (ii) the sss are touching one another. (Uzquiano 2004:445) 
 
Note that this paraphrased sentence evidently still employs the resources of plural logic. Now, I 
will propose another paraphrase for someone who sincerely dislikes plural quantification, only in 
terms of quantification over sets.  Such a paraphrase would look like this: 
 
There is a set of sets, X, of simples so that (i) for any set S of simples, if S is in X, then the members of S are 
arranged brick-wise, and (ii) the members of X are touching each other.  
 
So, a set-theoretic method of paraphrase can either be purely set-theoretic plus a higher order (here, 
monadic third-order) singular quantification, or, a mix of set theory and first order singular 
quantification. To conclude: one who appeals to set theory as (part of) the paraphrase method 
either will have to use it along with plural logic, or with monadic third-order logic. 
 
5.1. REVISED SET-THEORETIC METHOD OF PARAPHRASE 
Now, I will argue that as long as predicates of the form ‘…are arranged F-wise’ are demanded as 
part of the nihilist’s paraphrase method, the set-theoretic paraphrase in its simplest form is 
inadequate for regimenting the talk of composites. For starters, notice that although it is plausible 
to think that the nihilist wouldn’t want to consider an arrangement of simples as chair-wise if that 
arrangement is radically different than a chair-wise-looking one, (e.g., if the members of the plurality 
have a knife-wise arrangement) still, she would want to call it a chair if, for example, some few 
electrons are gone, or some few protons are added to the arrangement. This means that as long as 
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the nihilist employs the notion of ‘arrangement’ in her paraphrase method, she has to also allow 
for some tolerance in the arrangements, because that’s how the ordinary talk of composite objects 
works and it should be reflected in the paraphrased talk of composites as well, otherwise the 
translation wouldn’t fully capture the talk of composites. 
A composite object, therefore, cannot be identified with the set of its constituting elements 
(i.e., a fixed set), because the arrangements are usually tolerant to small changes, but sets are not: 
removing even one element from a set destroys it. For example, the set of natural numbers without 
1 is just another set.  The solution is simple, however: one can posit that at each time and each possible 
world, the table is identical to its constituting simples that are arranged F-wise at that time and that 
possible world. Let 𝑆 be the union of all sets of simples each of which exists at some time and some 
possible world. Under the revised set-theoretic paraphrase method, then, the table is identified with 
a function of the form: 
𝑓: 𝑇 × 𝑊 → ℘(𝑆), 
Which assigns to each tempro-modal pair a subset of S—an element from the power set ℘(𝑆) of 
S—which satisfies the property of having table-wise arranged elements in that time and that possible 
world. This function allows for the required tolerance of arrangements of simples. Let’s call such a 
function a tempro-modal profile. The nihilist’s revised set-theoretic paraphrase method now posits that 
each object is identical to some tempro-modal profile.23 
Notice that the ontology of the revised set-theoretic paraphrase is the same as the original 
one, plus time and possible worlds.  
In the end, note that weak universalism faces a similar ‘tolerance’ problem, and 
accordingly, they will also need to revise their paraphrase method by appealing to possible worlds 
and time to capture the tolerance that the talk of composites allows for. 
 
5.2. FROM WEAK NIHILISM TO WEAK UNIVERSALISM 
So far we have seen how the talk of composites can be paraphrased in terms of sets of simples. The 
set-theoretic paraphrase, as the Background section suggests, can be used by both the weak nihilist 
                                                 
23 Notice that my revised paraphrase method for nihilism in terms of tempro-modal profiles, although look like 
(Hawthorne 2006b)’s “modal occupation profiles”, does not necessarily end up with the doctrine of plenitude (as 
opposed to Howthorne’s): the revised set-theoretic paraphrase method posits that for every object there is such a profile, 
whereas the doctrine of plenitude posits that for each profile there is such an object, which is not necessarily the same as the 
former claim.  
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and the weak universalist. Remember that weak nihilism stated that there are no composites, but 
there are sets of simples—complexes—under certain arrangements, whereas weak universalism 
stated that for any plurality of objects, there is a complex object. These two views are however 
consistent. They would be inconsistent only if the weak nihilist denies the existence of complexes 
for certain pluralities, while admitting them for certain other pluralities. But that’s not part of the 
definition of ‘weak nihilism’ as I have introduced it. In this subsection, I will argue that appeal to 
standard set theory will lead the weak nihilist to endorsing weak universalism, and that if a weak 
nihilist refuses do so, she will end up with some sort of obscure, weak set theory that in turn will 
render weak nihilism as uninteresting. The argument is very straightforward and runs as follows: 
If, say, an orange is a set of simples arranged orange-wise, and Donald Trump is a set of 
simples arranged Trump-wise, why not thinking of the set containing the simples arranged orange-
wise and those arranged Trump-wise, together as a an object under a certain arrangement of its 
simples (say, orange-Trump-wise)? More generally, if the weak nihilist believes that the set 𝑆1 of 
simples arranged F-wise and the set 𝑆2 of simples arranged G-wise as complex objects in her 
ontology, why wouldn’t she do the same for the set 𝑆 of simples under whatever the arrangement 
of those simples is (say, F-G-wise)? By merely enriching the language that already includes general 
terms such as ‘orange’ or ‘table’—which are typically applied to ordinary objects—to include 
general terms of the form ‘orange-table’ (or any other form as wished), one can easily extend weak 
nihilism to weak universalism. And once the weak nihilist added to terms in to the language and 
realized that she’s a weak universalist, it would seem that she can just rid of the new terms and 
remain a weak universalist; after all, the terms don’t have any important job to do (except somehow 
being useful to describe the structure of certain objects in terms of simples) and it seems plausible 
to assume that once we decide to un-name things, or to stop using any terms to refer to them, they 
don’t fade away from existence. In other words, if the weak nihilist has to convert to a weak 
universalist, she doesn’t need to deal with arrangement predicates anymore, as—by definition—the 
weak universalist doesn’t do so. 
Note that if the weak nihilist ever decided to block certain objects of weak universalism 
(e.g., orange-Trumps), she needs to come up with some explanation on why some simples form 
sets but some others do not. Standard set theory not only doesn’t support such discriminations 
against set formation, but it also posits that the union of any given pair of sets is a set (Axiom of 
Union). So, owing to the Axiom of Union, the union 𝑆 ≔ 𝑆1 ∪ 𝑆2 of the sets 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 of simples 
is also a set. Therefore, the weak nihilist will have to either refuse to accept the Axiom of Union, 
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or restrict it in some way to reach her desired result. But the former strategy damagingly weakens 
the resulting set theory (hence the mathematics based on it), and the latter faces the question of how 
to even start restricting the axiom for accommodating to the ontological prejudices of the nihilist; 
is it that a plurality of simples amounts to a set whenever there seems—based on grounds such as 
perception, common sense, etc.—that there is an object (hence committing to some sort of 
idealism—see part one of the thesis)? What are the grounds upon which the nihilist would want to 
draw such distinctions between existing and non-existing complex objects? Whatever grounds they 
are, even if the nihilist manages to implement them, they complicate the ideological commitments 
of the nihilism, and further, again, weaken and obscure away set theory for not much motivating 
reasons (accommodating the talk of composites versus a huge chuck of mathematics and other 
sciences and/or philosophical theories based on the standard set theory with its full capacity). At 
any rate, this seems like an unworthy gamble for the weak nihilist, and I take it that the wiser option 
for the weak nihilist would be just to confess to her fault, surrender to the weak universalist, and 
hope for forgiveness! Note that the same kind of argument can be given to argue that the revised 
weak nihilism (which appeals to possible worlds and time) will naturally grow into the revised weak 
universalism.  
To conclude, I argued that by assuming weak nihilism and the standard set theory (that 
allows for union of any number of sets to be a set, regardless of what their elements are), it seems 
that weak nihilism naturally grows into weak universalism. 
 
6. PLURAL QUANTIFICATIONAL PARAPHRASE 
As I mentioned earlier, some people such as Van Inwagen propose a paraphrase of the talk of 
composites in terms of quantification over pluralities of simples, rather than sets of them. This—due 
to the alleged ontological innocence of plural quantification—has the advantage of avoiding 
commitment to collective entities like sets. In the framework of plural logic, ‘some chairs are heavy’ 
would be translated to ‘some plurality of simples which are arranged chair-wise, are heavy’. But this 
paraphrase method, although can capture singular quantification over composites in terms of plural 
quantification over simples, cannot capture plural quantification over composites in the same way: 
that’s “used up”, as Uzquiano puts it. Consider again the brick example: ‘some bricks are touching 
each other’. Earlier, I discussed the kind of paraphrase that uses plural quantification and set theory 
simultaneously, and revealed the ideological and ontological posits of that approach. Now, we want 
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to have a systematic method of regimentation of the talk of composites in terms of the talk of 
simples, somehow using only the resources of plural quantification. Over the next two subsections, 
I will address two options that (Uzquiano 2004) suggests for this, namely plurally plural quantification, 
and, monadic second-order logic enriched with  plural properties. 
 
6.1. PLURALLY PLURAL QUANTIFCIATION AND PARAPHRASE 
Consider again the sentence ‘some bricks are touching each other’. We are supposed to give a 
paraphrase of the quantification and predication on composites in terms of simples. (Uzquiano 
2004) suggests using plurally plural quantification over simples for this purpose. Our example will 
be then regimented as follows, under such a method: 
 
Some simplest, the xxxxs, are such that (i) for any simples, the xxs, and for any simples, the yys, if 
the xxs are among the xxxxs and the xxs communicate with the yys, then the xxs are different from 
the yys and the yys are among the xxxxs.(Uzquiano 2004:438) 
 
Henceforth, I will address the kind of nihilism based on this sort of paraphrase method as Plurally 
Plural Nihilism, which is a species of strong nihilism. 
 
6.2. PLURAL PROPERTIES AND PARAPHRASE 
As (Boolos 1984) has famously observed, the theories of plural first-order quantification (PFQ) 
and monadic second-order quantification (MSQ) are inter-definable. That is, one can translate any 
statement from each of these to an equivalent statement from the other one. The believer of 
composition can appeal to this observation and paraphrase away plural quantification over 
composites in terms of monadic second-order quantification over composites.  
But the nihilist denies the existence of composites, and understand them in terms of either 
pluralities or sets of simples under certain arrangements. So they—if interested in paraphrase 
methods in terms of monadic second-order logic—have to accommodate the monadic second-
order logic to somehow deal with pluralities of simples, or sets of them. 
The standard way to interpret statements of monadic second-order logic is in terms of 
quantification over properties of individuals. For example, ‘X(x)’ is read as ‘x instantiates the property 
X’. So the sentence ‘some bricks are touching each other’ can be expressed with monadic second-
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order logic as follows:  
 
For some [singular property] X, (i) there is some x such that Xx, (ii) for any x, if Xx, then x is a 
brick, and (iii) Touching-Each-Other(X).(Uzquiano 2004:441) 
 
Now a similar strategy can be employed as a paraphrase method for the nihilist, except that in 
addition to plural quantification over simples understood as singular quantification over singular 
properties of simples, one should also regiment plural quantification over composites somehow in 
terms of some sort of properties of simple. What kind of properties are we looking for? (Uzquiano 
2004) suggests the nihilist to use plural properties (i.e., properties that are instantiated by pluralities of 
individuals simultaneously, rather than individuals one by one), in addition to singular properties. 
Therefore, under this strategy, the sentence ‘some bricks are touching each other’ is paraphrased 
away as follows: 
 
For some plural property of simples 𝕏, (i) there are some simples, the xxs, such that 𝕏 applies to 
the xxs, (ii) for any simples, the xxs, if X applies to the xxs, then the xxs are arranged brick-wise, 
and (iii) 𝕏 exemplifies the property touching-each-other.(Uzquiano 2004)24 
 
Now, let us see what logical resources does the nihilist who appeals to plural properties for the sake 
of paraphrase needs. First off, notice that as (Boolos 1984) has observed, in order for plural 
quantification to gain the full expressivity of monadic second-order logic (equivalently, in order for 
a translation function to transfer the full expressivity of MSQ to PFQ—see below), requires a 
comprehension principle for singular properties, which runs parallel to the comprehension principle for 
the monadic second-order logic25: for any given singular predicate 𝜑, we have: 
(CP)    ∃𝑢𝜑(𝑢) → ∃𝑥𝑥∀𝑢(𝑢 ≺1 𝑥𝑥 ↔ 𝜑(𝑢)). 
Where 𝜑 a variable for a singular predicate is, 𝑥𝑥 is a plural variable, ≺1 is the predicate ‘… is one 
of’. Note that xx should not occur free at 𝜑(𝑢). In English it says: if a singular predicate 𝜑 is 
instantiated, then there is a plurality xx so that to be one of them is equivalent to instantiate the 
predicate 𝜑.  
                                                 
24 (Uzquiano 2004) only uses ‘X’ to represent plural properties. I represent them by ‘𝕏’ to distinguish them from 
singular properties which are already represented by ‘X’. 
25 ∃𝑋∀𝑢(𝑋(𝑢) ↔ 𝜑(𝑢)), for any formula 𝜑 such that 𝑋 doesn’t occur free at 𝜑. 
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But now the nihilist seems to be going beyond monadic second-order logic: a new kind of 
variables and predicates are added to the syntax of the language of MSQ: plural variables, and 
predicates that take those variables as arguments. Let us call the new logic MSQ*. It’s easy to 
observe that MSQ* is strictly more expressive than MSQ and correspondingly, there is more into 
it than what is already translatable to PFQ. For example, let X stand for the plural property ‘… is 
infinite in number’. It seems that the well-formed sentence ∃𝑥𝑥𝑋(𝑥𝑥) in the language of MSQ* 
(read: “there is a plurality of individuals that is infinite in number”) does not have any equivalent in 
the language of MSQ: no finite sentence that contains singular predicates and individuals (i.e., the 
only resources of MSQ) corresponds to that sentence. On the other hand, every fact which is 
expressible in the language of MSQ is obviously expressible in MSQ*, as the latter is a natural 
generalization of the former. Now, suppose that we want to translate MSQ* in terms of plural 
quantification, similar to Boolos’s translation of MSQ in terms of PFQ. What kind of resources 
would the nihilist need to add to PFQ? Note that in the case of Boolos’s translation, the translation 
function 𝑇𝑟′: ℒ𝑀𝑆𝑂 → ℒ𝑃𝐹𝐿 from the language of MSQ to the language of PFQ has the following 
properties: 
𝑇𝑟′(𝑋(𝑥)) = 𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥, 
𝑇𝑟′(∃𝑋. 𝜙) = ∃𝑥𝑥. 𝑇𝑟′(𝜙) ∨ 𝑇𝑟′(𝜙∗). 
Where X stands for a singular property, and 𝜙∗ is the result of substituting 𝑥 ≠ 𝑥 for all 
occurrences of 𝑋(𝑥), which is supposed to cover the cases where nothing instantiates the property 
𝑋. Now, let us call the appropriate extension of PFQ that MSQ* is translatable into, PFQ*. Now, 
demanding a translation function 𝑇𝑟": ℒ𝑀𝑆𝑄∗ → ℒ𝑃𝐹𝑄∗ from the language of MSQ* to the language 
of PFQ* automatically leads to certain expectations from PFQ*, parallel to the case of the MSQ-
PFQ translation: 
𝑇𝑟"(𝑋(𝑥𝑥)) = 𝑥𝑥 ≺2 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 
𝑇𝑟"(∃𝑋. 𝜙) = ∃𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥. 𝑇𝑟′′(𝜙) ∨ 𝑇𝑟′′(𝜙∗). 
Where X stands for a plural property, and 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 is a plurality of pluralities. That is, to have a proper 
translation from MSQ* to PFQ*, pluralities of pluralities must be taken into account. Therefore, PFQ* 
must minimally contain the resources of plurally plural quantification. Also, in order for the 
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translation function 𝑇𝑟" to transfer the full expressivity of MSQ* to PFQ*, a plurally plural 
comprehension principle is needed26: for a given plural property 𝜙, 
(PCP)   ∃𝑢𝑢 𝜙(𝑢𝑢) → ∃𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ∀𝑢𝑢(𝑢𝑢 ≺2 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ↔ 𝜙(𝑢𝑢)).
27 
In English, this says: if a plural property 𝜙 is instantiated, then there is a plurality of 
pluralities xxxx so that to be a plurality among them is equivalent to instantiate the plural property 
𝜙. 
In short, if the nihilist enriches the language of monadic second-order logic by employing 
plural variables and properties, then the resulting logic will be inter-definable with plurally plural 
logic. So, in terms of ideological commitments, this paraphrase method will be as complex as 
plurally plural logic (henceforth, I will address this sort of strong nihilism as the plural property 
nihilism). 
Too much for ideological commitments. What are the ontological commitments of plural-
property nihilism? (Uzquiano 2004) best describes this. For starters, note that in order for the 
quantification over properties to achieve the full effect of the monadic second-order quantification, 
we have to assume that for any individuals 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛, there is a property that only those 𝑥𝑖s have 
it, and no other object. Similarly for plural properties: for any pluralities 𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑛, there is 
a plural property that only those pluralities have. So, just in terms of numbers, this means that the 
number of properties (singular or plural), are way more than the number of composites that a 
conservative, or even a universalist about composition believes there are. After all, for any simples 
𝑥1 to  𝑥𝑛, there is a singular property that is only instantiated by them, and for any pluralities 𝑥𝑥1 
to 𝑥𝑥𝑛, there is a plural property that only applies to them. So overall, a myriad of properties—
singular or plural—must exist in order for this paraphrase to work out, which puts the “nihilist”— 
one who used to proudly advocate the ontological parsimony of nihilism—in an awkward position 
compared to the believer of composition. But things get even more awkward when we start asking 
what those properties are. There doesn’t seem to be much literature on metaphysical nature of 
plural properties and how they are related to the singular ones. (Uzquiano 2004), following 
(Hossack 2000) and, offers a reading of plural properties according to which they are plural universals 
                                                 
26 (Uzquiano, 2004 - footnote 16) also predicts, although cautiously, a need for plurally plural quantification in order 
to invoke a comprehension principle for plural properties. 
27 This comprehension principle for the plurally plural logic presumably runs parallel to a hidden corresponding 
comprehension principle in the language of MSQ*, of the following form: ∃𝕏∀𝑢𝑢(𝕏(𝑢𝑢) ↔ 𝜑(𝑢𝑢)), for any 
formula 𝜑 such that 𝕏 doesn’t occur free at 𝜑. 
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being instantiated collectively by simples to produce plural states of affairs. Whatever that might 
mean, even if that clears up our doubts about the nature of plural universals, the claims that they 
have to exist in reality in such a great abundance, and further that certain higher-order universals 
(such as the one associated to the property touching-each-other) have to exist and be instantiated with 
them, all just for the nihilist to be able to justify the apparent talk of composites in terms of simples, 
sounds like a quite doubtful and unmotivated metaphysical position. As Uzquiano puts it: 
 
The worry, in short, is that it is unclear that such a staggering ontology of plural and higher-order 
universals is independently motivated, and, in the absence of such independent motivation, it would 
certainly be disappointing if the nihilist and semi-nihilist had to resort to them in order to mitigate the 
counterintuitiveness of their position.(Uzquiano 2004:442) 
 
But there is another prominent way to interpret second-order variables: in terms of sets, where ‘X(x)’ 
is read as ‘x is a member of the set X’. That way, plural properties of simples will be understood as 
sets of simples, and properties that take them as variables as sets of sets, etc. In our case, the nihilist 
can paraphrase away plural quantification over simples in terms of second-order quantification over 
sets of simples, and similarly, plural quantification over composites will be second-order 
quantification over sets of composites. But in section 5 I argued that since the nihilist denies the 
existence of composites, this will cost her in using monadic third-order quantification over sets of sets of 
simples. That is, if the nihilist wishes to avoid the plural-property paraphrase method and its awkward 
and unmotivated ontology, she can alternatively appeal to the set-theoretic semantics of monadic 
third-order logic as a framework for paraphrasing the talk of composites in terms of simples. But I 
have already addressed the set-theoretic paraphrase method and its prospects in section 5, so I’ll 
finish this section here. 
 
7. PRESERVING MEREOLOGICAL STRUCTURE 
In section 6.1 I discussed the minimal logical resources that the plurally plural nihilist has to use to 
paraphrase singular and plural quantification over composites somehow in terms of only simples 
and plural quantification. So far, however, we have been only considering composite object without 
their mereological structure. The examples that we were primarily interested in were of the form 
‘there is a table’ or ‘some bricks are touching each other’. But the believer of composition can also 
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talk about the mereological structure of composites, along with the composites themselves. To give 
an example within the lines of (Bennett 2009b), note that someone who believes in composites is 
allowed to state familiar claims such as ‘an organ is composed of cells, each of which is composed 
of organelle, each of which are composed of molecules, each of which are in turn composed of 
atoms’. 
Now, for the nihilist—who denies that there are any atoms or molecules or cells, etc.—one 
natural question is raised: how can they reflect these mereological structures in their paraphrase? As 
Bennett observes, the nihilist needs to come up with paraphrases of the following form, to capture 
the mereological structure embedded in the sentence above: “[…] ((((((there are simples arranged 
atomwise) arranged moleculewise) arranged organellewise) arranged cellwise) arranged organwise)” 
(Bennett, 2009, p. 60) 
But what is the logic that underlies sentences that contain such structured arrangement 
predicates? It seems that the nihilist will have to the resources appeal to higher-order plural 
quantificational to accommodate these. For example, the Berennet’s sentence will have to be re-
written as follows: 
 
(I) There is a 5th-order plurality xxxxxxxxxxs of simples which is arranged organwise, and every 4th-
order plurality xxxxxxxxs of simples that is one of the pluralities in xxxxxxxxxxs is arranged cell-
wise, and every 3rd-order plurality xxxxxxs that is one of pluralities in xxxxxxxxs is arranged 
organellewise, and every 2nd-order plurality xxxxs of simples that is one of xxxxxxs is arranged 
moleculewise, and every plurality xx of simples that is one of the pluralities in xxxxs is arranged 
atomwise. 
 
As one can see, such a paraphrase—in order to capture the compositional structure—needs to 
appeal to the resources of 5th-order plural logic. It’s easy to come up with even more complicated 
compositional structures so that the nihilist will have to need to employ predicates and plural 
quantifications of even higher to reflect the compositional structure in their translations. In short, 
the nihilist who only wants to stick to simples in her ontology will have to subscribe to full higher-
order plural quantification—that allows for plural quantification of any finite order—in order to be 
able to reflect the arbitrary mereological complexity of composite objects that the composition-
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believer could simply just talk about by using a single predicate for parthood, plus perhaps first-
order plural quantification. 
Notice that this complexity issue is not only what the plurally plural nihilist faces, but also 
what many conservative theories of composition that deny some of the posits of universalism yet 
paraphrase the talk of the denied objects only in terms of simples will have to face. They need to 
employ full higher-order plural quantification to be able to reflect mereological structures of 
different complexities in their paraphrase method.  
Take for example organicism, put forward by (Van Inwagen 1995). In the lights of this view, 
only living organisms are composite objects, and all artifacts, dead organisms, etc. are just pluralities 
of simples with certain arrangements. In general, organicism and nihilism share almost all the same 
thoughts about composition and paraphrase, except when it comes to living things; the organicist 
considers them as existing composite objects whereas the nihilist denies their existence. 
But why does the organicist need the full higher-order plural quantification for her 
paraphrase strategy? Admittedly, the example from (Bennett 2009b) given above doesn’t well reveal 
this fact, because to the organicist, organelle, cells and organs are all alive. But consider a very 
complex artifact, perhaps a space shuttle. A space shuttle is made up of thousands of pieces of 
different size, starting from screws and nuts to all sorts of pieces that, when put together in the 
right way, will—according to someone who believes in composition for certain artifacts—compose 
the space shuttle. Now suppose that a NASA engineer is giving a presentation about the 
compositional structure of the space shuttle, and Peter van Inwagen is among the audience for 
some reason. Since admittedly a space shuttle is not a living organism, then if Inwagen wants to 
paraphrase the speech of the engineer in terms of simples, he will face the same problem as the 
plurally plural nihilist faced: he will need to employ plural logic and arrangement predicates of god-
knows-what-order. In general, the organicist, in order to be able to reflect the mereological structure 
(of arbitrary complexity) of artifacts in his paraphrase methods, needs to employ full higher-order 
plural logic. 
Note that it is easy to come up with similar sentences that reveal mereological structure to 
argue to any conservative view that denies the existence certain composite objects and appeals to 
paraphrase methods to regiment the talk of those whose existence are denied only in terms of 
simples, will have to appeal to full-higher order plural logic. 
Finally, notice that capturing mereological structure does not make a problem for those 
who, besides simples, posit some sort of collective entities for any plurality of simples, so that those 
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collective entities somehow contain those simples. The collective entities that we have encountered 
were sets, plural properties, and composites, and the theories of composition corresponding to 
them—weak universalism, plural-property nihilism, and strong universalism, correspondingly—all 
associated one such entity to any plurality of simples. In general, in a paraphrase of sentences 
containing mereological structure in terms of arrangement, the collective entities can function as a 
place-holder and makes us needles of using structured arrangement predicates and higher-order 
plural quantifications. For instance, the universalist, if asked to use arrangement predicates, can 
simply read Brennet’s sentence as follows, instead of (I): 
 
An organ is (the composition of) a plurality of organelle arranged organ-wise, and each of its organelle is (the 
composition of) a plurality of molecules arranged organelle wise, and each of those molecules is (the composition of) a 
plurality of atoms arranged molecule-wise. 
 
So, the strong universalist doesn’t have to commit to higher-order plural predicates and 
quantifiers, because to them, in order to compose, say, F, it seems to be enough to be arranged F-
wise, and they can use the same parthood predicate for any stage of the mereological structure. 
Similar story holds for other collective entities and their corresponding theories of composition. 
 
8. ABDUCTIVE METHODOLOGY AND THEORY CHOICE 
The summary of all the ideological and ontological posits of the three major methods of paraphrase 
that I have discussed is summarized in the following table. But first let us also check the ontological 
and ideological commitments of the two variants of universalism. By definition, strong universalism 
posits that for any plurality of simples there is a composite object, and weak universalism posits 
sets of simples (instead of composites) for each plurality of simples. The former has therefore has 
ontological commitments to composites (besides simples), whereas the latter has ontological 
commitments to sets (besides simples). Strong universalism needs plural logic and a predicate for 
parthood. Weak universalism, on the other hand, needs a predicate for set-membership, and—in 
order to accommodate the talk of pluralities of complexes—either plural logic or monadic third-
order logic. 
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Framework Position Ideology Ontology 
 
 
 
 
Mereology 
 
Strong Universalism 
First-order plural 
logic, and a 
parthood predicate 
 
 
 
 
Simples, 
Composites 
Organicism and any 
conservatism that 
appeals to paraphrase 
methods to paraphrase 
the denied objects only 
in terms of simples 
First-order plural 
logic, full higher-
order plural logic, 
and a parthood 
predicate  
 
 
 
 
Set Theory 
 
 
 
 
Weak 
Nihilism/Universalism 
(revised versions) 
First-order plural 
logic and a set-
membership 
predicate 
OR, 
Monadic third-
order logic and a 
set-membership 
predicate  
 
 
 
Simples, sets, 
possible worlds, time 
 
 
 
Theory of 
Plural 
quantification 
 
 
Plural 
Logic 
 
 
Plural Property Nihilism  
 
 
First- and second-
order plural logic 
A staggering number 
of  plural 
properties/universals 
of at least first- and 
second-order 
 
Plurally 
Plural 
Logic 
 
 
 
Plurally Plural Nihilism 
 
First-order plural 
quantification, Full 
higher-order plural 
quantification 
 
 
Simples 
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It’s widely held that simplicity or parsimony is a criterion of theory choice, especially in metaphysics. 
For example, (Brenner 2017) argues that if theoretical simplicity (including ideological or 
ontological simplicity) is a criterion of theory choice in science, it is a criterion of theory choice in 
metaphysics, because as he argues, there is no fundamental difference between science and 
metaphysics that justifies such a criterion for science, but not for metaphysics. This attitude towards 
philosophy is also in accordance to Timothy Williamson’s non-exceptionalist program in philosophy 
(Williamson 2007), according to which philosophy is located in a continuum of other sciences such 
as mathematics and natural sciences, and they share many aspects, such as certain kinds of 
methodology. (Brenner 2017) surveys some prominent theories of metaphysics are favored to their 
rivals based on simplicity. For example, David Lewis in (Lewis 1986) defends his modal realism 
based on ideological simplicity. Similarly, (Sider 2013) defends compositional nihilism mainly based on 
its ideological simplicity: he thinks by removing the predicate for parthood, the ideology and ontology 
become simpler and hence, the theory is more likely to be true (and if my thoughts in this thesis 
are on the right track,  he is wrong!) He states that the argument from ideological simplicity 
presupposes an epistemic principle: “ideologically simpler theories are more likely to be true.” 
(Sider, 2013, p. 3). Also: “The epistemic principle is most naturally paired with a metaphysical 
realism about ideology. Ideologically simpler theories aren’t just more convenient for us. The 
worlds that they purport to describe are objectively simpler, contain less structure. Ideology is a 
worldly matter, not about ideas at all.” (T. Sider, 2013, p. 4). Finally, other thing equal, it is plausibly 
held that a theory with a more parsimonious ontology (i.e., with fewer kinds of objects) is to be 
preferred to others. 
Granting these methodological considerations, certain theories from the above table will 
instantly lose to strong universalism over ideological simplicity. For example, plurally plural 
nihilism, organicism and other conservatives who employ paraphrase methods for paraphrasing the 
talk of denied objects only in terms of simples, all have more complicated ideology than strong 
universalism (full higher-order plural logic—first, second, third, fourth, and nth-order plural logic, 
for any finite number n—versus first-order plural logic plus a parthood predicate).  
In section 5.2 we observed that weak nihilism naturally leads to weak universalism. Now, 
to compare weak and strong universalism, note again that the former’s ideology consists of first-
order plural logic and a parthood predicate, whereas the latter commits to either first-order plural 
logic and a set-membership predicate, or third-order singular logic plus set-membership predicate. 
But admittedly, it’s not so obvious which one among these is a “simpler”. We don’t have a catalogue 
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on simplicity of theories to tell us whether, say, plural logic plus a parthood predicate is simpler 
than plural logic plus a set-membership predicate. On the other hand, they seem to be at the same 
level of simplicity: a set-membership predicate for a parthood predicate.  
One might object: “But set membership predicate is needed elsewhere, anyway. For 
example, a big chunk of mathematics relies on that, so there will be no shame for the nihilist to also 
commit to it. In a sense, it is more fundamental than the parthood relation.” First of all, as I have 
explicitly mentioned before, in this thesis I’m not much concerned with factors such as higher 
explanatory power, or fundamentality of concepts, when comparing theories. But even if we let 
that kind of objection to arise, it’s not clear whether set-membership relation is more fundamental 
than parthood relation. For example, (Lewis 1991) proposes an alternative to ∈-based set theory 
itself by using plural logic and parthood relation, and similarly, (Hamkins and Kikuchi 2016) have 
shown certain mereological formulations of set theory are as equally expressive as the ∈-based set 
theory. I won’t pursue this issue further; the point is to make the objector not to be very quick 
when it comes to the fundamentality of set-membership predicate. 
So it doesn’t seem we can proceed much with regards the ideological comparisons between 
weak and strong universalism, and further that they seem to be at the same level of complexity. 
What about ontology? Strong universalism needs to only posit material simples and composites, 
but as we observed in section 5.1, for the weak nihilists/universalists to capture the “tolerance” of 
composite objects to small changes, they need to appeal, besides simples, to sets, possible worlds 
and time. So, both the kind and the number of objects that the weak nihilist/universalist needs is 
more than the ones of the strong universalist, so the latter seems to enjoy a more parsimonious 
ontology than the former. I take it that this works overall in favor of strong universalism. 
What about plural-property nihilism? Again it doesn’t seem quite clear weather first- and 
second-order plural logic is less parsimonious than first-order plural logic plus parthood predicate. 
We just don’t have any clear-cut criteria of simplicity to compare such cases where one predicate is 
traded with one kind of quantification. But ontologically speaking, as we observed at the end of 
section 6.2, plural-property nihilism posits a staggering ontology of obscure plural properties, which 
not only puts the nihilist in an awkward position (selling composites in the hope of a more 
parsimonious ontology, yet ending up with even more entities of a different sort—abstract rather 
than concrete—and obscure in nature), as (Uzquiano 2004) mentions, if we understand (plural) 
properties and (plural) universals, it would be quite doubtful whether universals of such plentitude 
and diversity should indeed exist in reality, just for the nihilist to be able to eliminate and paraphrase 
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the talk of composites. In short, an ontology that contains material simples and composites is more 
parsimonious and less obscure than the underdeveloped ontology of plural-property nihilist. I take 
this as a sign that strong universalism is overall more parsimonious than plural-property nihilism.  
Now, given the previous lines, it turns out that strong universalism is more parsimonious than 
the rival theories of composition that we have considered, hence should be chosen as the best 
theory of composition.  
Before finishing the thesis, one last remark is in order: the abductive comparisons that are made 
here only take into account ideological and ontological parsimony. If one considers other theoretical 
virtues such as explanatory power, fundamentality, or whatever, then the final conclusion might be 
entirely different. For example, it might turn out that weak universalism can solve more puzzles 
and paradoxes in other areas of philosophy, or that its ontological commitments are needed anyway, 
in certain other areas of science. In that case, weak universalism should be preferred to strong 
universalism. I leave such possibilities open to further investigations. 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
In the first part of the thesis I argued that if our perceptual experience of ordinary objects is an 
indicator of their existence, then so is perceptual experience of extraordinary objects an indicator 
of their existence. I appealed to a recent metaphysical account of perception that argues for the 
crucial assumption that ordinary objects exist, and proposed certain thought-experiments that 
render such possibilities, in order to argue for the existence of extraordinary object. I argued that 
this gets us very close to universalism, but admittedly, it doesn’t quite get us there: some pluralities 
of objects—e.g., the plurality of galaxies with even number of planets—don’t seem to be even 
possibly perceivable as a single object. I then argued that—on the pain of committing to certain 
species of idealism—abductive reasoning selects universalism as the best theory of composition 
that respects the crucial assumption and further explains away the existence of the myriad of 
ordinary and extraordinary objects that has been argued for. It is left as an open question whether 
other arguments from perception for the existence of ordinary objects can be generalized to argue 
for the existence of extraordinary objects, similar to the case of Byrne’s line of argument. 
In the second part of the thesis I raised a nihilist objection to the crucial assumption of the 
argument in the first part, which blocked my argument for universalism. I laid out a detailed analysis 
of different formulations of nihilism and universalism, and argued that among them, (strong) 
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universalism—which posits a composite object for every plurality of objects—has either the 
simplest ideology or ontology compared to the rival theories of composition. That suggests that—
if we ignore other deciding factors such as explanatory power—universalism is abductively the best 
theory of composition among the ones considered here. It is left as an open question whether 
considering other deciding factors will change the result of the abductive comparisons. 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I will argue for compositional universalism, according to which, any plurality of 
objects composes an object. In the first part of the thesis I will argue that if ordinary objects—the 
ones that are typically perceived by humans’ perceptual system as objects—exist, then so do 
extraordinary objects. I appeal to certain metaphysical accounts of perception to argue for a great 
number of extraordinary objects in a similar way that some conservatives about composition 
would argue for ordinary objects, which in turn suggests that such conservative views are either 
false or insufficient. I then use abductive methodology to argue that universalism is the best 
theory that respects the assumption of existence of ordinary objects, and further explains the 
existence of the ordinary and extraordinary objects which are argued for. The second part takes 
into consideration the fact the compositional nihilist, who denies occurrence of composition, 
refuses to accept the assumption that ordinary objects exist, hence blocks my argument for 
universalism. I lay out a detailed analysis of ideological and ontological commitments of different 
species of nihilism and universalism about composition, and argue on abductive grounds that 
universalism is the simplest theory of composition among many of them. 
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